[Analysis] What lessons can be learned from the evacuations from Sudan? For a more realistic rapid deployment capability

(B2) The feedback from the evacuation of European citizens in Sudan proves it. National means and good intergovernmental coordination are essential. Is that enough? What would a European capability bring? But where have the battlegroups gone?

Coordinated operations have allowed the evacuation of more than 2500 people (EU and non-EU), according to a latest balance sheet of the EEAS.

Entry first, French virtue

France, strong from its base in Djibouti, led the way, executing “ entry first ". She negotiated (with others) a safe conduct to be able to extract her nationals (and others) and use a military base north of Khartoum as a point of support (read on the blog: How was the French evacuation operation in Sudan prepared and planned?).

The groundbreaking tactic

It then deployed its special forces to mark out and reconnoitre the terrain, its logistics elements to ensure the correct airport rotation, and finally its planes. Before retreating and leaving the way to others: the Germans took over, then the British. According to the good old tactic of the African "rezzou" (raid), specific to the marine infantry and adapted to the terrain of the emergency.

Intergovernmental coordination

Coordination therefore took place in intergovernmental between the forces involved in the field (with the Americans and the British in particular). Along the way, Paris demonstrated the usefulness of Djibouti's stronghold in the eyes of other Europeans and the need to keep forces prepositioned throughout the world, in order to be able to intervene quickly.

A revenge of the French doctrine

This is not by chance. At the military level, this modus operandi remains the trademark of France, a key point of its military doctrine and a strong axis on which its mode of deployment is modeled. At the political level, France has always wanted a European force, assuming that it sees the light of day, to be centered on this "first entry" (read: Let's create a European entry force first! 14 states are for). A point on which Paris did not really win the case during the debates on the new rapid deployment capability. The example of Sudan demonstrated the usefulness of this tactic.

A movement between Europeans?

Upstream coordination

These are joint training, essentially at NATO level, the habit of political coordination at European level, such as consular cooperation, within theIPCR, which helped. At the tactical level, on the spot (in Sudan, or in Djibouti), as in the capitals or in Brussels, political coordination was permanent. But it remained intergovernmental: coordination between Europeans and not European coordination. Each has thus borne its own costs (economic as well as political). And political Europe has remained invisible.

Potential efficiency gains

Two flaws that the High Representative of the European Union, Josep Borrell, has in mind. The operation to evacuate European citizens from Sudan “ was well coordinated ". It allowed to evacuate about 2500 people (European or not). Certainly. " But it would probably have been more effective if it had been possible to have a pan-European capability, with a single command and pan-European forces. “, he confided to B2 after the meeting of the ministers of Defense, Tuesday (May 23).

A double financial and political advantage

« This would not have required the deployment of successive military units from each army that came to protect [its] operation and left with it. " That would have been " much more efficient in terms of cost and deployment ". And " the idea of ​​unity between Europeans would be much more valued”.

Demonstrated utility

For the head of European diplomacy, rapid deployment capability (EURDC), as defined in the strategic compass would therefore be “ very useful ". " We had already seen it during the evacuation of Kabul airport. We saw it again with the recent evacuation in Sudan. " According to him, " it is clear that we need, at European level, to have capabilities of this type [...] to have an intervention force ».

A lack of appetite from Member States

The head of European diplomacy is however well aware that he remains " many things to do by 2025 (planned date for the entry into force of this capacity). It is necessary, in particular, strengthen the military planning and conduct capability” the MPCC, to make it a real European headquarters of " command and control [...] as predicted by the strategic compass ". But, " for this we need resources from the Member States ". And while Germany is willing to provide a large share, other member states are still reluctant.

A certain failure of outdated concepts

A slow European capacity to emerge

Wait until 2025 to ensure a ramp-up of the new rapid deployment capability that may be necessary in the face of complexity. But this long delay of three years is totally unsuited to the current international situation. Nor is it said that if it had existed, this Capability would have been able to intervene in a situation like in Sudan. The Europeans had indeed, theoretically, battlegroups, which is normally the role and the task, but which remained objects of showcase.

The forgetting of battle groups

Neither the Visegrad group, led by Poland, nor the Helbroc group, led by the Greeks and comprising the Balkan countries, have thus been put on alert. Question of available means, of political will, of absence of tropism on the zone of intervention..., several objective reasons can be found. But the symbolism is there: in the emergency, no one, including at European level, mentioned, for a single moment, their possible deployment. Which will come as no surprise as this failure is recurrent (see also: Reviewing the concept of battlegroups: a necessity). A device which provides, in a fixed way, long in advance, for groups of nations which, when the time comes, have neither the desire nor the means (military, logistical, political, economic) to intervene because that does not correspond to their priorities of the moment, to their military doctrine or quite simply to the political tempo (1), is unlikely to work.

States still reluctant

The war in Ukraine has not changed the dynamism of the Member States on this point. Both for national (politico-economic) reasons but also for substantive reasons. They are still reluctant to provide instruments for joint intervention, often preferring either a wait-and-see attitude or the umbrella of NATO (therefore of the Americans). And this is nothing new, as Josep Borrell reminded us. “Since the definition of the Petersberg missions ", to 1992 peak, who are " there has never been an evacuation organized by a European Union force or power ».

The main unresolved questions

The few solutions concocted for the rapid deployment capability (rotation over one year instead of six months, more sustained training upstream on the basis of crisis management scenarios, etc.) do not seem capable of solving the problems. Does a State want, can it, does it have sufficient knowledge to intervene in a given country or situation? We can and we must therefore wonder about the usefulness for evacuation operations of a structure of forces, which appears so slow and cumbersome to implement.

Other more functional solutions?

Three elements are lacking today at the European level: the politico-military will to intervene alone capable of guaranteeing rapid intervention, a financing solution and a European political decision making it possible to display European solidarity.

A system based on a framework nation

In the end, the evacuation from Sudan demonstrated that several member states or a framework nation, with a strong cooperation/coordination mechanism, can do the job perfectly. Based on this experience, a principle of organization emerges, based not on a fixed group of papers, but on a system staggered in the time of intervention, which can evolve according to the countries concerned.

An intervention staged over time, varying on the premises

Firstly, a nation or a group of nations ensure the entry first (because they have the political will and the military device), the others follow and consolidate the device or take over. Secondly, the system can evolve according to the place of intervention: in Africa, France appears qualified on entry first. But for the Middle East, the Balkans or the Eastern Neighbourhood, other countries (Germany, Czechia, etc.) would undoubtedly be more qualified. Ditto for the North zone or Asia. It comes down to the device doors-Treaty of Lisbon, with a framework nation, dedicated by country or zone of country.

political visibility

A decision and following the best practices Europeans entrusting a group of States with the task of carrying out a specific operation, of the Article 44 type of the Treaty, could be enough. For a question as simple and consensual as the evacuation of European citizens, a priori, a simple meeting of COPS ambassadors and a decision in written procedure may suffice. The coordination of this mini-operation, which can be entrusted with dual management, to the High Representative and to the EU staff (within the support unit) as well as to the framework nation taking charge of the 'evacuation.

A financial bonus

Funding could be provided by the European Peace Facility, which has demonstrated — particularly since the start of the war in Ukraine — its adaptability to events, its flexibility and its speed of intervention. The timeframe for this decision is irrelevant here: the Facility can operate retroactively and on reimbursement.

A pragmatic solution

This device would have the advantage of simplicity: a few men and women in reinforcement at the headquarters (during the operation or for pre-planning), a few million euros for the Facility (which is low in view of the billions committed to Ukraine) (2). Upstream, military and political planning, often already carried out (several countries already having national evacuation plans) would be more shared at European level (reinforced coordination). In terms of strategic communication, each country would benefit at the national level, but European unity and solidarity would be demonstrated. There would thus not be one but several rapid deployment capabilities.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

1. In this case, Greece was in an election period, Poland concentrated on the situation in Ukraine.
2. A financial ratio in any case provided for two-thirds by the large Member States, but which would allow the “small” States which benefit from the evacuation without paying a penny, to ensure financial solidarity.

Also read (Rapid Deployment Capability):

• [News] European Parliament backs rapid deployment capability, but with conditions
• [Memo] The new rapid deployment capability. Composition, decision, financing

About Battlegroups:

• Military Committee: the redesign of battlegroups is on the table
• We must reinvigorate the battlegroups and fill the gaps in operations (military committee)
• Supported EU battlegroup deployment costs. If a battlegroup is ever deployed

On the European Peace Facility:

• [Dossier N°94] The European Peace Facility implemented. Budget, decisions, assistance measures (v10)
• [Memo] How does the European Peace Facility Committee work?
• European Peace Facility: delivery conditions, checks, guarantees and reports
• Common costs covered for military missions and operations (European Peace Facility)
• The European Peace Facility 2021-2027. Objective, budget, financing, decision-making method, operation, audit...

And (on the Blog) - on the evacuation from Sudan:

• [News] Evacuation from Sudan. The big ignition delay of the British
• [News] Sagittarius, Eva Sierra…! Several rotations ensured by the Europeans. About 1500 people evacuated (v7) 
• [News] Evacuation of diplomats and citizens in Sudan, a Land Air Sea operation is being prepared (v4)