[Analysis] Defense Ministers in Minor Mode. Until When?

(B2) In the European Union, defense ministers are in a minor mode, incapable of making decisions alone, of meeting frequently, or for long periods. The domestic and international context, on the contrary, requires a certain consistency and capacity for action. A shortcoming that is, however, easy to resolve...

The Accessory Syndrome

Short meetings

The meeting of European Union Defense Ministers, which just took place on April 3 in Warsaw, in an "informal" format, proved this. It was as short as possible: two sessions of 2 hours each. This leaves little room for debate (30). There was a circumstantial element, it's true. A meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers (with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio) was starting at the same time in Brussels. The EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas, who chaired the meeting, was also due to arrive in Brussels for dinner. Changing the schedule seemed too complicated. So it was decided to rush the meeting. This was no accident.

"Incapable" minors

In the European architecture, the Defense meeting remains, in fact, secondary. Officially, it is always a Foreign Affairs meeting in Defense "format"! Defense ministers do not have the power to adopt texts, even when they meet formally (2). This role belongs to the Foreign Ministers. Even for strictly defense-related subjects, such as the conclusions on the Common Security and Defense Policy. Sometimes, subterfuges are used to mask this reality. For example, the publication of the text is delayed to give the impression that it was the Defense Ministers who adopted it. But the fact remains. Defense is not among the sectors selected for a full Council formation (3).

Very irregular

Since they never decide anything, the defense ministers don't need to see each other often. There is only one formal meeting and one informal meeting per six months of the presidency. This is very little, especially in a troubled international context and in an area—defense—that has officially become a European priority. Whereas the foreign ministers meet at least once a month formally (not counting informal meetings or attendance at other meetings such as European Councils or UN General Assemblies). The same goes for the ministers of European Affairs or Agriculture.

From a small quarrel... to a big question

Three explanations can be given. First, there are petty internal power struggles at the European and member state levels. Foreign ministers, jealous of their prerogatives, want to maintain control. Hence the supervision over their defense colleagues. The same goes for economy ministers, who don't want to see "spendthrifts" meddling in the budget. It should be noted that nothing in the treaties provides for such dependence.

The Shadow and the Power of Attraction of NATO

Then there is a more ideological, very political issue. For many member states, there is no question of overshadowing the Atlantic Alliance: the "real" meeting of defense ministers takes place within NATO, not the European Union.

The times are changing

The last reason is historical: defense was neither a priority nor a direct European competence. But this reason has now disappeared. Politically, financially, and technically, defense has, in fact, become a European competence, at least in terms of support and assistance for the industrial aspect, but also for the political aspect. All institutions (Commission, Parliament, European Council) now regularly address this issue.

A current political necessity

Really debate

Despite the "big words," there remains an inability at the government level to understand that European defense policy requires a full and complete body of defense ministers. However, nothing would prevent defense ministers from holding meetings more frequently, or from giving them a longer, more interesting format. It just depends on the will of the EU High Representative and the country holding the rotating presidency (Poland today, Denmark tomorrow).

It costs nothing to take the plunge

Nor would anything prevent this "Council of Defence Ministers" from being given additional capacity for debate (on rearmament, defence financing) or from debating or co-debating texts that concern them primarily, such as the one on strengthening the European defence industry (EDIP). Or from giving it real decision-making power. It would be enough to modify the decision that sets the Council's formations (3). A decision that is taken by a simple majority (4) and has almost no budgetary implications (5).

A notorious contradiction to be resolved

The European Commission has appointed a Defense Commissioner. The European Parliament has elevated its Security and Defense Subcommittee (SEDE) to a full-fledged parliamentary committee. The Council, which is the primary decision-making body at the European level, especially in matters of defense (which remains a primary competence of the Member States), is lagging behind. This is a notorious contradiction that must be resolved. More than just grand words, European defense policy requires concrete action and effective decision-making procedures.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

1. With 29 or 30 participants (27 ministers + High Representative + NATO or European Parliament), that's about 4-5 minutes per participant. Barely enough time to express one's point of view. There's no opportunity to speak again or engage in a real debate.
2. Except when they meet in the format of the European Defense Agency's board of directors, where they can decide, among other things, on the agency's budget or its work program. A very limited role, however.
3. Provision anchored in the Council's internal regulations.
4. And not by qualified majority.
5. The Council's General Secretariat is accustomed to absorbing the organization of extraordinary or additional meetings, which has been the case regularly during past crises (financial, migration, Ukraine). It may be necessary to delegate some administrators, but staff redeployments may be sufficient. At worst, the additional cost would be very minimal.

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