Foreign interference. Russia, China, Qatar… Europe just has to prepare well (R.Glucksmann)

(B2) The Russian invasion of Ukraine gives the European Parliament's report on foreign interference a resonance that its authors would not have imagined or desired. It only makes its findings and first recommendations, definitively adopted this Thursday (March 10), all the more crude. Interview with the chairman of the special INGE commission, the Frenchman Raphaël Glucksmann (Place publique/S&D).

• It is a thick report on foreign interference which was adopted by a very clear majority, of 552 votes 'for', 81 'against' and 60 abstentions.
• Of the 65 pages, 18 are devoted to diagnosis, with a mapping of interference in all its forms (disinformation, manipulation of social media, cyber attacks, hidden funding of political parties and cooptation of elites, etc.).
• This report concludes 18 months of work by the special commission, launched in June 2020. It begins the second stage of the commission, whose mandate has just been extended by one year, to monitor the implementation of its recommendations (see framed).

You say: “we have been light and indolent for too long” in protecting democracies against these foreign interferences. What's fault ? 

“Our leaders were fed on the myth of the end of history and they were convinced that we no longer had a strategic enemy. We could have diplomatic or economic or commercial rivals from time to time, but no more great confrontation. Until very recently, there was a form of indolence in the European political, cultural and media elites. We did not want to see the nature of the confrontation in which we are immersed.

Are the Baltic States more advanced in the awareness and tools they are developing? 

“Of course, because they have to. Estonia in particular, as early as 2007, suffered a series of violent attacks, a cyber war by the Russians. Estonia alerted. But we thought it was Cassandre, an excitement linked to the traumatic memory of the Soviet occupation. We didn't want to see what was going on.

You mentioned the case of the SEDE sub-committee infiltrated by the daughter of Mr Peskov (Kremlin spokesperson), parliamentary assistant. Has the protection been strengthened since? 

— There is still no system of vetting on access to sensitive information. Even at the European Commission, we considered that we could refrain from any security measures. It's distressing. In fact, it takes a mental revolution. Understand — and here we learn in a hurry — that history remains tragic, that in this world we have deep, systemic adversaries of our democracies and for a regime like Putin's, the very existence of the European Union poses a problem . 

In the series of recommendations, which take on greater importance or urgency as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? 

- I want to say, all at the same time! Suddenly, everything we didn't want to see jumps in our face. For example, the fact that former European leaders, ministers, are starting to resign from Russian companies, we realize how scandalous it was. But what will we say if China begins to invade Taiwan? When are they going to quit? For once, can't we be proactive and demand the minimum of decency and fidelity to our interests and our nation from our former leaders? 

Second point, the cyber war, which preceded the military invasion (in Ukraine). We are not ready, we have not made the necessary investments in cybersecurity. We have seen analyzes on the capacities of States to resist cyber-warfare, it is extremely weak! Even private companies under invest in cybersecurity. 

Third fundamental point: we must be sure that our elections are not influenced by outside money. For this, we must harmonize our electoral legislation. We have 27 different and often contradictory laws. We need to establish a common framework in Europe. 

A framework on the financing of political parties? 

— Yes, on political life and public life. We have foundations, associations that are financed by oligarchs. We have no idea who finances what in our public debate!

The news dramatically illustrates one of the dangers to which you warn: misinformation. The High Representative says he is working on a new sanction mechanism. Does this correspond to what the report claims? 

— We are calling for a new sanction mechanism either on cyber attacks or on disinformation campaigns. I think that our recommendations will be implemented extremely quickly, because the report is not voted that Josep Borrell announces that he implements them. Is that enough? Obviously not. We advocate an intersectoral approach. But the penalty is the basis. Because today from the point of view of the Russian regime or the Chinese regime, we have lost all deterrent force. 

Do we manage to identify each time the sources of disinformation, cyber attacks?

- Most of the time we manage to identify. Take the other example of hostile investments in strategic sectors. We have studied it long, wide and across. When we talk about Gazprom, Huawei or others, they are not private companies like the others. Because they are an integral part of a political system. They are armed arms. By refusing to name the Chinese or Russian regimes as dangerous for us, because we do not consider them as our adversaries, we are pretending to consider Gazprom or Huawei as a tulip company in the Netherlands! This is the fundamental error. The same thing happened with the employment of our officials. We cannot prohibit former heads of state, government, ministers, bureaucrats from going to work for the private sector, okay. On the other hand, it is not at all the same thing as going to work for a fishing company in Norway or Gazprom in Russia! 

So, what do we do ? are we reviewing a code of good conduct? 

— We must name the problematic entities. We must make the lists and tell our officials that they cannot go to work for companies that are considered strategically dangerous for us. 

You also talk about China in the report. Are we also blind to China? 

— We're beginning to stop being so. I remember the hearing of Josep Borrell who told us, as a sincere warning, that in his departments there were few or no people speaking Chinese. So we are late! But we realized. We ask that the means be put in place to also monitor Chinese activities. We are not asking for a budget increase but for a tenfold increase in effort! Because if Russia carried out the interference in the most brutal and systematic way, behind there are others. I think in Qatar, it is another fundamental problem to have left Qatar to such an extent to make a deal in the political class. There is also Turkey, Azerbaijan.

The report cites agencies like Australia's National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator, Sweden's New Psychological Defense Agency, Lithuania's National Cyber ​​Security Center? Is it an agency like these that we need on a European scale? 

— At least one general coordinating agency is needed. Because everyone feels that it has become the subject, but it must not go all over the place. We need a coordination body that can supervise and see where there are holes. However, we must be certain that there are no weak links left in the Member States. I am thinking, for example, of the difficulties we had before obtaining the end of the 'golden' passports (2). 

The vulnerability of PSDC missions is also highlighted, as is their role in detecting this type of attack. Are these missions a gateway that we have not consolidated enough? 

— These missions are extremely vulnerable and we see this today, for example, in Mali. We let the Wagner group swallow countries. In the Central African Republic, incredibly violent disinformation campaigns were allowed to spread against the French army, for example, with a massive impact on the ground. And which endangers the lives of the soldiers who are sent.

So misinformation kills...

—  What must be understood is that there is no physical, material life and on the other hand, an evanescent life which would be the digital and cyber world. A cyber attack can have physically deadly consequences and a disinformation campaign can have deadly consequences. You can destroy a country without necessarily sending bombs, or you can prepare to send bombs by destroying the infrastructure via cyber attacks. We must therefore manage to bring about this mental revolution that we are calling for and break the traditional chains that structure the thought of the European ruling classes.

The report calls for a "positive" approach, what does that mean? 

— The Taiwanese have learned to build their democracy even as they endured unbelievable waves of attacks from the Chinese CP. What they passed on to us is that the best way to defend a democracy is to make it as lively as possible. They have one " whole of society approach they have debureaucratized the fight against misinformation. They involved the maximum participation of citizens, journalists, think tanks, NGOs, to create a democratic ecosystem equipped with antibodies, which repels assaults.

What do you propose ? 

Our democratic societies in Europe are far too bureaucratic, and more vulnerable. We therefore want to push in this second part of the commission all these measures which have a positive dimension, on the financing of public life, on-going democracy, the question of the media, etc. We haven't had time to develop all the more “positive” part of the longer-term recommendations. This is what justifies the extension of the special commission for one year. (1)

(Comments collected by Emmanuelle Stroesser)

Interview conducted by telephone on March 9 in French

Download the investigation report adopted

1. Decision adopted by the European Parliament on Thursday (10 March).
2. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on Wednesday (9 March) to demand common rules from the European Commission to fight against the sale of citizenship to foreigners under the pretext of investments, more clearly called "golden passports". The practice is particularly renowned in three Member States, Malta, Bulgaria and Cyprus. In other more numerous States, the practice of the “golden visa” is also required. Moreover, some (France, Italy and Germany) have announced that they now want to limit it for wealthy Russians.

Read also:

• Foreign interference: the European Parliament sounds the tocsin!
• Russia is interfering everywhere in Europe: in Germany, in France, in the Baltic countries. Khodorkovsky accuses
• Foreign interference and artificial intelligence. Key topics for the European Parliament. Two special commissions formed (v2)

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The main recommendations of the European Parliament

The report's recommendations focus on this " what to do to remedy the flaws, the laws to pass, how to fight against the far west in the digital world, so that the rule of law reigns there to use the words of the rapporteur, Latvian Sandra Kalniete (Unity/EPP).